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Abstract
We consider the optimal reinsurance problem from the point of view of a direct insurer
owning several dependent risks, assuming a maximal expected utility criterion and inde-
pendent negotiation of reinsurance for each risk. Without any particular hypothesis on
the dependency structure, we show that optimal treaties exist in a class of independent
randomized contracts. We derive optimality conditions and show that under mild assump-
tions the optimal contracts are of classical (non-randomized) type. A specific form of the
optimality conditions applies in that case. We illustrate the results with some numerical
examples.
Keywords: Reinsurance, Dependent Risks, Premium Calculation Principles, Expected Util-
ity, Randomized reinsurance treaties
1 Introduction
Reinsurance constitutes a risk mitigation strategy and an essential tool in risk management.
By transferring part of the risk to the reinsurer, the cedent company seeks a trade-off between
profit, which is reduced by the reinsurance premium, and safety, which is increased by the
reduction in exposure to the underlying risk. A large amount of works can be found in liter-
ature concerning optimal reinsurance strategies, as this problem has been for long considered
in the actuarial community. The first works date as far back as the 60s, with the seminal
paper of Borch [Borch, 1960]. It has been the subject of active research not only in the
field of actuarial science, where the risk transfer contract between two insurance companies
is usually analysed within a one-period setting, see for instance [Gajek and Zagrodny, 2004,
Cai and Wei, 2012, Chi et al., 2017, Albrecher and Cani, 2019, Hu and Wang, 2019], but also
in the financial mathematical context, within a dynamical framework usually in conjunction
with investment strategies, see for instance [Cani and Thonhauser, 2016, Gu et al., 2018]. We
refer to [Albrecher et al., 2017] for a comprehensive overview of the literature on optimal rein-
surance.
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In this work we consider the optimal reinsurance problem within a one-period setting and
from the cedent’s perspective, the interest of the reinsurer being enclosed in the calculation
principles considered for the reinsurance premium. The goal is the maximization of an ex-
pected concave utility of the insurer’s wealth, which in the case of the exponential utility is
known to be closely related with its adjustment coefficient [Guerra and Centeno, 2008].
In most works regarding optimal reinsurance, independence is assumed. Indeed, for many
years dependence has not been considered in the study of optimal risk transfer, possibly due
to its complexity. More recently, several works can be found accounting for dependencies,
prompt by the need for real, robust and reliable quantitative risk analysis. One of the first
works including the effects of dependence when investigating optimal forms or risk trans-
fer is [Centeno, 2005]. There, dependencies of two classes of insurance businesses, through
the number of claims, are included by means of a bivariate Poisson. Other authors have
considered the optimal reinsurance problem under dependence between claim numbers, such
as [Zhang et al., 2015] in a one-period setting and [Bi et al., 2016] in a dynamic setting. In
[Cheung et al., 2014b], the authors do not assume any particular dependence structure, as
they argue it is often difficult to determine it. They propose instead to use a minimax opti-
mal reinsurance decision formulation, in which the worst-case scenario is first identified. In
[Cai and Wei, 2012], positive dependencies in the individual risk are considered by means of
the stochastic ordering.
Due to the analytical complexity of problems including dependencies, many works propose
numerical frameworks [Bai et al., 2013, Asimit et al., 2017, Asimit et al., 2018, Zhang et al., 2016].
It is also worth mentioning the empirical approach proposed in [Tan and Weng, 2014] and
[Sun et al., 2017], where reinsurance models are formulated based on data observation, with-
out explicitly assuming the distribution of the underlying risks, which allows for the use of
programming procedures to obtain an optimal solution.
Stop-loss was found to be optimal in several works which consider the expected value
premium principle and various optimality criteria, both in the independent [Borch, 1960,
Gajek and Zagrodny, 2004, Cheung et al., 2014a] and in the dependent cases [Cai and Wei, 2012,
Zhang et al., 2015].
Most authors include various constraints on the type of reinsurance contracts being con-
sidered. For example, in [Borch, 1960, Gajek and Zagrodny, 2004, Zhang et al., 2015] the
optimal solution is sought among combinations of quota-share and stop-loss treaties. A very
common constraint, included in most references above, is that the ceded risk to the rein-
surance is a decreasing function of the underlying risk. This is imposed to avoid solutions
allowing for moral hazard.
In this work we will impose no further constraints besides that the ceded risk should
be positive and should not exceed the underlying risk. We hope that by characterizing the
solutions of the problem free of constraints we contribute to a better understanding of the
necessity, role and impact of any constraints that might be introduced. The analysis of the
impact of the “no moral hazard” constraint in the optimal solution will be the subject of
future work.
Most literature on this topic considers forms or reinsurance of a deterministic nature, in
the sense that for a given risk X, solutions are seek in a set of functions of X defining for each
value of loss how much of that loss is ceded to the reinsurer. This is the traditional and intu-
itive way of formulating the problem. However, it has been shown that randomized treaties
may be preferable to deterministic ones. In [Gajek and Zagrodny, 2004] the author observes
that randomized reinsurance contracts may lead to lower ruin probability than deterministic
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ones, when an upper constraint on the reinsurance premium is imposed. The randomization
improvement decreases as the probability mass of every atom decreases. The randomized
decision can also be eliminated by adjusting the upper limit on the price of reinsurance.
In [Albrecher and Cani, 2019] the authors explore the potential of randomizing reinsurance
treaties to obtain optimal reinsurance strategies minimizing VaR under the expected value
premium principle. They provide a possible interpretation for the randomization of the rein-
surance treaty as the default risk of the reinsurer, since the indemnity may not be paid with
a certain probability. It is also argued the advantage of randomized treaties concerning moral
hazard issues, as due to randomness it is unclear a priori who will have to pay the claim.
The authors study the possibility of implementing additional randomness in the settlement
of risk transfer and show that randomizing the classical stop-loss can be beneficial for the
insurer. In [Guerra and Centeno, 2012], randomization of the reinsurance treaties is used as
a mathematical tool to find treaties minimizing several quantile risk measures when premia
are calculated by a coherent risk measure. In the present work, randomized contracts will also
serve as a mathematical tool to prove existence of the optimal contract when the underlying
risks are dependent through an arbitrary joint distribution. To the best of our knowledge,
this is the first time randomized treaties are analysed under dependencies.
In this work we consider the optimal reinsurance problem of n dependent risks. By risk
we mean the aggregate claims of a line of business, a portfolio of policies or a policy. The
dependence structure is arbitrary, defined through a generic joint distribution function. We
assume that reinsurance is negotiated separately (independently) for each risk, and each
premium is calculated by a (possibly different) function of moments of the ceded risk. The
cedent’s criterion is the maximization of the expected value of a concave utility function of
the overall retained risk, net of reinsurance premia. We introduce the class of independent
randomized strategies and show that it contains an optimal strategy. Optimality conditions
are obtained, and it is shown that under mild conditions, the optimal strategy is deterministic.
We then consider the particular cases of the expected value and variance type premium
principles. We show that, without any constraints on the optimal treaty, the stop-loss is not
optimal in general. In particular, the monotonicity constraint on the ceded risk considered in
[Cai and Wei, 2012] is an active constraint.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we formulate the optimization problem.
In Section 3 the class of randomized reinsurance strategies is introduced together with the
proper probability spaces, and the existence result is proved. In Section 4, we provide nec-
essary optimality conditions. In Section 5 it is shown that under very general conditions the
optimal treaty is deterministic. The special cases of the expected-value and variance related
premiums are developed. We conclude the paper in Section 6 with some numerical examples
and concluding remarks.
2 The optimization problem
We consider a portfolio of n ≥ 2 risks. Let Xi, i = 1, 2, ..., n denote the aggregate value of
claims placed under the i-th risk on a given period of time (say, one year). X = (X1, X2, ..., Xn)
is a non-negative random vector with joint probability law µX .
The direct insurer acquires a reinsurance policy for each risk separately. Each of these
policies is a measurable function Zi such that
Pr {0 ≤ Zi (Xi) ≤ Xi} = 1. (1)
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For each i = 1, 2, ..., n, let Zi denote the set of measurable functions satisfying (1), and let
Z =
n∏
i=1
Zi, the cartesian product of all Zi.
For each risk, the corresponding policy is priced by a functional Pi : Zi 7→ [0,+∞],
depending only on the probability law of Zi(Xi). In this paper, we assume that these premia
calculation principles are of type
Pi(Zi) = Ψi
(
EZi,EZ2i , . . . ,EZ
ki
i
)
, (2)
where Ψi : [0,+∞[ki 7→ R, i = 1, 2, . . . , n are continuous functions.
The insurer’s net profit after reinsurance is
LZ = c−
n∑
i=1
(Pi (Zi) +Xi − Zi (Xi)) , (3)
where c is the portfolio’s aggregate premium income, net of non-claim refunding expenses.
Thus, LZ is a random variable taking values in the interval ]−∞, c].
We assume that the insurer aims to choose a reinsurance strategy Z = (Z1, Z2, . . . , Zn) ∈
Z maximizing the expected utility of net profit, i.e., maximizing the functional
ρ(Z) = EU(LZ) Z ∈ Z, (4)
where U :]−∞, c] 7→ R is a concave nondecreasing function.
3 Existence of optimal reinsurance strategy
Under the formulation above, existence of an optimal reinsurance strategy in the class Z
can not in general be guaranteed. However, existence in the larger class of random treaties,
defined below, can easily be proved. Our approach to the problem outlined in the previous
section will be to obtain optimality conditions for random treaties and then discuss conditions
under which such conditions can only be satisfied by classical treaties of class Z.
3.1 Random treaties
First, let us introduce some notation. For any array x = (x1, x2, . . . , xn), we will use the usual
notation xi to denote the i
th element of x, and the notation x[i] to denote the array of n− 1
elements obtained from x by deleting the element xi, i.e.
x[i] = (x1, . . . , xi−1, xi+1, . . . , xn).
With the notation above, random treaties are defined as follows:
Definition 3.1 A Rn-valued random variable Z = (Z1, Z2, . . . , Zn) is said to be a vector of
(independent) random treaties or a randomized strategy if the following conditions hold for
i = 1, 2, . . . , n:
1. Pr {0 ≤ Zi ≤ Xi} = 1;
2. The random variable Zi is conditionally independent of the random vector
(
X[i], Z[i]
)
,
given Xi.
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The second condition in Definition 3.1 enforces the assumption that reinsurance is acquired
separately for different risks: given the value of Xi, the value of claims and refunds on other
risks have no bearing on the value of the refund Zi. However, Zi, Zj are not, in general,
independent random variables, due to dependency between Xi, Xj .
Reinsurance strategies of class Z discussed in Section 2 are called deterministic strategies
to distinguish them from randomized strategies defined above. Notice that for any determin-
istic strategy Z ∈ Z, the random vector (Z1(X1), Z2(X2), . . . , Zn(Xn)) satisfies Definition 3.1.
Thus, the class of deterministic strategies is a subset of the class of randomized strategies.
If expressions (2), (3), (4), are well defined for every deterministic strategy, then they are
also well defined for every vector of random treaties. Thus, we may consider the problem of
maximizing (4) over all vectors of independent random treaties.
3.2 Spaces of probability laws
Since (4) depends only of the probability law of the random vector (X,Z), we may discuss
optimization in terms of probability laws instead of the random vectors inducing such laws.
To this purpose, we will frame our argument in canonical spaces, i.e., we will consider the
underlying measurable space to be R2n provided with its Borel σ-algebra, BR2n . Random
variables are Borel-measurable functions ϕ : R2n 7→ R, and the space of Borel probability
measures ν : BR2n 7→ [0, 1] is denoted by P. Expectations with respect to a particular
probability law ν ∈ P are
Eνϕ =
∫
Rk
ϕ(u) ν(du),
provided the integral exists. The space P is provided with its weak topology, that is, a
sequence {νj ∈ P}j∈N is said to converge to ν ∈ P if and only if
lim
j 7→∞
Eνjϕ = Eνϕ
for every continuous bounded ϕ.
Let PX be the set of all ν ∈ P such that the marginal probability
νX(A) = ν (A× Rn) A ∈ BRn
is equal to µX , the joint probability law of the claim amounts, introduced in Section 2. We
write ν ∈ HX if and only if ν is the probability law of a random vector (X,Z) where X is the
vector of claim amounts and Z is some randomized strategy in the sense of Definition 3.1. It
is clear that HX ⊂ PX ⊂ P.
Coordinates in R2n are indicated as (x, z) = (x1, . . . , xn, z1, . . . , zn). For a given ν ∈ P,
νX , νZ indicate the marginal probability laws:
νX(A) = ν (A× Rn) , νZ(A) = ν (Rn ×A) A ∈ BRn .
Similar notation is used for other marginal probabilities, like νXi , ν(Xi,Zi), ν(X[i],Z[i]), etc..
Given ν ∈ P having a strictly positive density function f , the conditional probability law
of (say) (X[i], Z[i]) given (Xi, Zi) is the family of probability measures
ν(X[i],Z[i])|(Xi,Zi)(A) =
∫
A f(x, z)dx[i]dz[i]∫
R2n−2 f(x, z)dx[i]dz[i]
∀A ∈ BR2n−2 .
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Notice that, for fixed A ∈ BR2n−2 , ν(X[i],Z[i])|(Xi,Zi)(A) is a measurable function of (xi, zi)
defined up to null subsets of R2.
In the following, we will need to consider probability laws which do not have a density
function and/or do not have full support. Thus, we will consider regular conditional prob-
ability laws. For a given ν ∈ P, a mapping ν(X[i],Z[i])|(Xi,Zi) = Q : R2 × BR2n−2 7→ [0, 1] is
a regular conditional probability law of
(
X[i], Z[i]
)
given (Xi, Zi) if it satisfies the following
conditions:
(i) For every B ∈ BR2n−2 (fixed), the map (xi, zi) 7→ Q((xi, zi), B) is measurable with
respect to the Borel σ-algebra of R2;
(ii) There is a set A ∈ BR2 such that ν(Xi,Zi) (A) = 1 and for each (xi, zi) ∈ A (fixed) the
map B 7→ Q((xi, zi), B) is a probability measure in BR2n−2 ;
(iii) For every A ∈ BR2 , B ∈ BR2n−2 ,∫
A
Q((xi, zi), B) ν(Xi,Zi)(d(xi, zi)) =
=ν
{
(x, z) ∈ R2n : (xi, zi) ∈ A, (x[i], z[i]) ∈ B
}
.
Since
(
R2n,BR2n
)
is a standard measurable space, every ν ∈ P admits a regular conditional
probability law ν(X[i],Z[i])|(Xi,Zi) (see e.g. [C¸inlar, 2011], Theorem IV.2.7).
Conditional expectation of a random variable ϕ : R2n 7→ R is defined as
Eν(X[i],Z[i])|(Xi,Xi)ϕ =
∫
R2n−2
ϕ(x, z)Q(xi, zi, d(x[i], z[i])),
provided the integral on the right-hand side is well defined for ν(Xi,Zi)-almost every (xi, zi) ∈
R2. In that case, it is a measurable function of (xi, zi).
If conditioned and conditioning coordinates do not span the whole space R2n, then the
conditional probability law is defined as above with respect to the subspace spanned by the
coordinates concerned. For example ν(X[i],Z[i])|Xi : R×BR2n−2 7→ [0, 1] is defined with respect
to the marginal probability law ν(X,Z[i]) : BR2n−1 7→ [0, 1] instead of the joint probability law
ν. Conditional expectations of random variables ϕ = ϕ(x, z[i]) are defined as above, but the
conditional expectation operator ϕ 7→ Eν
(X[i],Z[i])|Xiϕ acts on random variables depending on
the full range of coordinates (x, z) by
Eν(X[i],Z[i])|Xiϕ =
∫
R2n−2
ϕ(x, z)Q′(xi, d(x[i], z[i])).
This is a measurable function of (xi, zi) ∈ R2, while
EνX[i]|Xiϕ =
∫
Rn−1
ϕ(x, z)Q′′(xi, dx[i])
is a function of (xi, z) ∈ R1+n.
Recall that two σ-algebras A1, A2 are conditionally independent given a σ-algebra B if and
only if Pr (A|σ(A1 ∪ B)) = Pr (A| B) for every A ∈ A2 (see e.g. [C¸inlar, 2011], Proposition
IV.3.2). Taking Definition 3.1 into account, HX can be characterized as the set of all ν ∈ P
satisfying the following conditions:
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(i) νX = µX ;
(ii) ν is concentrated on the set{
(x, z) ∈ R2n : 0 ≤ zi ≤ xi i = 1, 2, . . . , n
}
;
(iii) ν(X[i],Z[i])|(Xi,Zi) = ν(X[i],Z[i])|Xi , i = 1, 2, . . . , n,
i.e., for every A ∈ BR2n−2 , the function (xi, zi) 7→ ν(X[i],Z[i])|(Xi,Zi)(xi, zi, A) depends only
on xi.
The premium calculation principles (2) can be extended to ν ∈ HX such that EνZkii < +∞
through the obvious expression
Pi(ν) = Ψi
(
EνZi,EνZ2i , . . . ,EνZ
ki
i
)
. (5)
Similarly, the net profit random variable is the function Lν : R2n 7→ R defined as
Lν(x, z) = c−
n∑
i=1
(Pi(ν) + xi − zi) , (6)
and the expected utility functional (4) can be extended to ν ∈ HX by
ρ(ν) = EνU (Lν) . (7)
The following proposition provides an important reason to consider the space HX instead
of Z.
Proposition 3.2 HX is a compact subset of P.
Proof. It follows immediately from the definition of HX that
ν
(
[0,M ]2n
)
= µX ([0,M ]
n) ,
for any ν ∈ HX and M ∈ [0,+∞[. Since lim
M→+∞
µX ([0,M ]
n) = 1, this shows that HX is
uniformly tight. Hence, Prohorov’s theorem (see e.g. [Billingsley, 1999]) states that HX is a
relatively compact subset of P.
Fix ν ∈ ∂HX , and pick a sequence {νj ∈ HX}j∈N converging weakly to ν. Notice that for
every continuous bounded function α : R 7→ R,
Eνα(Xi) =
∫
R
αdµXi = E
νjα(Xi) ∀j ∈ N, i = 1, 2, . . . , n.
First, we claim that for any continuous bounded function ϕ : R2n−1 7→ R, the se-
quence
{
Eνj
(X[i],Z)|Xiϕ(X[i], Z)
}
j∈N
converges pointwise to Eν
(X[i],Z)|Xiϕ(X[i], Z) almost cer-
tainly with respect to µXi . To see this, notice that for any continuous bounded function
α : R 7→ R, we have
Eν
[
α(Xi)
(
Eνj
(X[i],Z)|Xiϕ(X[i], Z)− E
ν
(X[i],Z)|Xiϕ(X[i], Z)
)]
=
7
=EνEνj
(X[i],Z)|Xi [αϕ]− E
νEν(X[i],Z)|Xi [αϕ] = E
νj [αϕ]− Eν [αϕ] .
Since αϕ is continuous and bounded in R2n, weak convergence of νj implies that the differ-
ence above converges to zero. Since α is arbitrary, this implies that Eνj
(X[i],Z)|Xiϕ converges
pointwise to Eν
(X[i],Z)|Xiϕ.
Now, consider continuous bounded functions α : R2 7→ R, ϕ : R2n−2 7→ R. Since νj ∈ HX ,
we have:
Eν
[
α(Xi, Zi)
(
Eν(X[i],Z[i])|(Xi,Zi)ϕ(X[i], Z[i])− E
ν
(X[i],Z[i])|Xiϕ(X[i], Z[i])
)]
=
=Eν
[
α
(
Eν(X[i],Z[i])|(Xi,Zi)ϕ− E
ν
(X[i],Z[i])|Xiϕ
)]
−
− Eνj
[
α
(
Eνj
(X[i],Z[i])|(Xi,Zi)ϕ− E
νj
(X[i],Z[i])|Xiϕ
)]
=
=Eν
[
αEν(X[i],Z[i])|(Xi,Zi)ϕ
]
− Eν
[
αEν(X[i],Z[i])|Xiϕ
]
−
− Eνj
[
αEνj
(X[i],Z[i])|(Xi,Zi)ϕ
]
+ Eνj
[
αEνj
(X[i],Z[i])|Xiϕ
]
=
=Eν [αϕ]− Eνj [αϕ] + Eνj
[
Eνj
(X[i],Z[i])|XiαE
νj
(X[i],Z[i])|Xiϕ
]
−
− Eν
[
Eν(X[i],Z[i])|XiαE
ν
(X[i],Z[i])|Xiϕ
]
=
=Eν [αϕ]− Eνj [αϕ] +
+ Eν
[
Eνj
(X[i],Z[i])|XiαE
νj
(X[i],Z[i])|Xiϕ− E
ν
(X[i],Z[i])|XiαE
ν
(X[i],Z[i])|Xiϕ
]
.
The sequence Eνj
(X[i],Z[i])|XiαE
νj
(X[i],Z[i])|Xiϕ is essentially bounded and converges pointwise to
Eν
(X[i],Z[i])|XiαE
ν
(X[i],Z[i])|Xiϕ. Therefore, weak convergence of νj and Lebesgue’s dominated
convergence theorem guarantee that the right-hand side in the equality above goes to zero
when j goes to infinity. This shows that
Eν
[
α
(
Eν(X[i],Z[i])|(Xi,Zi)ϕ− E
ν
(X[i],Z[i])|Xiϕ
)]
= 0.
Since α is arbitrary, this implies that Eν
(X[i],Z[i])|(Xi,Zi)ϕ = E
ν
(X[i],Z[i])|Xiϕ almost certainly
with respect to ν(Xi,Zi). Since ϕ is arbitrary, this implies ν(X[i],Z[i])|(Xi,Zi) = ν(X[i],Z[i])|Xi and
therefore ν ∈ HX . Thus, HX is closed and therefore it is compact.
3.3 Existence of random maximizers
Now, we prove that the functional (7) admits a maximizer in the space HX , i.e., the optimal
reinsurance problem admits a solution in the class of randomized strategies (Theorem 3.4).
To this purpose, we will need the following result concerning moments of ceded risks.
Proposition 3.3 If EXki <∞, then the functional ν 7→ EνZki is continuous in HX .
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Proof. Consider a sequence {νj ∈ HX}j∈N, converging weakly to some ν ∈ HX .
By weak convergence, for every M < +∞ we have
Eν (Zi ∧M)k = lim
j→∞
Eνj (Zi ∧M)k ≤ lim inf
j→∞
EνjZki .
Since EνZki = lim
M→∞
Eν (Zi ∧M)k, this proves that
EνZki ≤ lim inf
j→∞
EνjZki .
If E
[
Xki
]
< +∞, then lim
M→+∞
Eν
[
Xki χ{Xi>M}
]
= 0. Since
lim sup
j→∞
EνjZki ≤ lim sup
j→∞
Eνj
[
(Zi ∧M)k +Xki χ{Xi>M}
]
=
= lim
j→∞
Eνj (Zi ∧M)k + Eν
[
Xki χ{Xi>M}
]
=
=Eν (Zi ∧M)k + Eν
[
Xki χ{Xi>M}
]
,
we see that
lim sup
j→∞
EνjZki ≤ EνZki .
The main result in this Section is the following.
Theorem 3.4 If EXkii < ∞ for i = 1, 2, . . . , n, then the expected utility functional (7) is
upper semicontinuous in HX and therefore admits a maximizer.
Proof. Suppose that EXkii < ∞ for i = 1, 2, . . . , n, and fix a sequence {νj ∈ HX}j∈R con-
verging weakly to some ν ∈ HX .
By the definition of HX ,
Eνjϕ(X) = Eνϕ(X) ∀j ∈ N,
for any measurable function ϕ : Rn 7→ R such that the expectation on the right-hand side is
well defined (possibly infinite). Therefore,
EνjU
(
c−
n∑
i=1
(Pi(νj) +Xi − Zi)
)
=
=EνEνjZ|XU
(
c−
n∑
i=1
(Pi(νj) +Xi − Zi)
)
.
By Proposition 3.3, the argument in the proof of Proposition 3.2 can be used to show that
EνjZ|XU
(
c−
n∑
i=1
(Pi(νj) +Xi − Zi)
)
→ EνZ|XU
(
c−
n∑
i=1
(Pi(ν) +Xi − Zi)
)
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pointwise when j → ∞. Further, since the utility function U :] − ∞, c] 7→ R is concave
nondecreasing, it is continuous and bounded above by U(c) < +∞. Therefore, due to Fatou’s
Lemma:
lim sup
j→∞
EνjU
(
c−
n∑
i=1
(Pi(νj) +Xi − Zi)
)
≤
≤Eν lim sup
j→∞
EνjZ|XU
(
c−
n∑
i=1
(Pi(νj) +Xi − Zi)
)
=
=EνU
(
c−
n∑
i=1
(Pi(ν) +Xi − Zi)
)
,
i.e., the functional (7) is upper semicontinuous in HX .
Existence of a maximizer follows by Weierstrass’ theorem.
4 Optimality conditions
For any i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, (xˆi, zˆi) ∈ R2, and ε ≥ 0, let Bi,ε = Bi,ε(xˆi, zˆi) denote the cylinder
Bi,ε =
{
(x, z) ∈ R2n : (xi − xˆi)2 + (zi − zˆi)2 ≤ ε2
}
Fix ν ∈ HX . We consider perturbations of ν, that is, probability laws ν˜ = νi,xˆi,zˆi,α,ε
defined as
ν˜(A) =ν (A \Bi,ε) + ν {(x, z) ∈ Bi,ε : (x, z + αei) ∈ A} .
Notice that if 0 ≤ zˆi < xˆi (resp., 0 < zˆi ≤ xˆi) and 0 ≤ α < xˆi − zˆi (resp., zˆi − xˆi < α ≤ 0),
then ν˜ ∈ HX for every sufficiently small ε ≥ 0.
Before we proceed, we need to introduce a few lemmas.
Lemma 4.1 If EXki < +∞ then, for any ν ∈ HX :(
Eν˜ − Eν)Zki = αν (Bi,ε)(kzˆk−1i +O(|α|) +O(ε)) , (8)
when α→ 0, ε→ 0+.
Proof. It follows from the definition of ν˜ that(
Eν˜ − Eν)Zki =∫
Bi,ε
(
(zi + α)
k − zki
)
dν =
∫
Bi,ε
∫ 1
0
k(zi + tα)
k−1αdtdν =
=α
∫
Bi,ε
∫ 1
0
k
(
zˆk−1i + (zi + tα)
k−1 − zk−1i + zk−1i − zˆk−1i
)
dtdν.
Lemma 4.2 For any k ∈ N, let
Dk =
{
x ∈]0,+∞[k: x1 < x
1
2
2 < x
1
3
3 < · · · < x
1
k
k
}
.
For any non-negative random variable Y such that EY k < +∞:
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1.
(
EY,EY 2, . . . ,EY k
) ∈ Dk ∪{x ∈ [0,+∞[k: x1 = x 122 = x 133 = · · · = x 1kk }.
2. EY =
(
EY 2
) 1
2 =
(
EY 3
) 1
3 = . . . =
(
EY k
) 1
k if and only if Y is degenerate, i.e., if and
only if it takes a constant value almost surely.
Proof. Pick i, j such that 1 ≤ i < j ≤ k. Using Ho¨lder’s inequality, we obtain
EY i ≤
(
E1
j
j−i
) j−i
j (EY j) ij = (EY j) ij ,
with the equality holding if and only if {1, Y i} are linearly dependent.
Lemma 4.3 Let Pi be the premium calculation principle (5), and suppose that Ψi is contin-
uously differentiable in Dki. Then, for every ν ∈ HX such that νZi is not concentrated at one
single point:
Pi(ν˜)− Pi(ν) = αν (Bi,ε)
 ki∑
j=1
jzˆj−1i
∂Ψi
∂uj
+O (|α|) +O(ε)
 , (9)
when α → 0, ε → 0+. Here, the partial derivatives ∂Ψi∂uj are evaluated at the point u =(
EνZi,EνZ2i , . . . ,EνZ
ki
i
)
.
If ∇Ψi : Dki 7→ Rki can be extended by continuity to the set{
x ∈ [0,+∞[ki : x1 = x
1
2
2 = . . . = x
1
ki
ki
}
,
then (9) holds for every ν ∈ HX .
Proof. Due to Lemma 4.2, we have
Pi(ν˜)− Pi(ν) =
=
∫ 1
0
d
dt
Ψi
(
EνZi + t(Eν˜ − Eν)Zi, . . . ,EνZkii + t(Eν˜ − Eν)Zkii
)
dt.
Hence, the Lemma follows from Lemma 4.1.
Now, we can formulate the main result in this section:
Theorem 4.4 Let U :]−∞, c] 7→ R be continuously differentiable in ]−∞, c[, let ν ∈ HX be an
optimal randomized strategy, and suppose that EνU(Lν) > −∞. Fix i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} such that
the function Ψi is continuous in Dki ∪
{
u ∈ [0,+∞[ki : ui = u
1
2
2 = . . . = u
1
ki
ki
}
, continuously
differentiable in Dki, and suppose the following assumptions hold:
(A1) Either the gradient ∇Ψi : Dki 7→ Rki can be extended by continuity to the set{
u ∈ [0,+∞[ki : u1 = u
1
2
2 = . . . = u
1
ki
ki
}
, or the marginal distribution νZi is not concen-
trated at a single point.
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(A2) There is some δ > 0 such that EU(Lν − δ) > −∞.
Then:
1. The inequality ⌊
Eν(X[i],Z[i])|XiU
′ (Lν)
⌋
(xˆi, zˆi) ≤
ki∑
j=1
jzˆj−1i
∂Ψi
∂uj
EνU ′(Lν), (10)
holds for any (xˆi, zˆi) ∈ R2 such that
0 ≤ zˆi < xˆi, ν(Bi,ε) > 0 ∀ε > 0. (11)
2. The inequality ⌈
Eν(X[i],Z[i])|XiU
′(Lν)
⌉
(xˆi, zˆi) ≥
ki∑
j=1
jzˆj−1i
∂Ψi
∂uj
EνU ′(Lν), (12)
holds for any (xˆi, zˆi) ∈ R2 such that
0 < zˆi ≤ xˆi, ν(Bi,ε) > 0 ∀ε > 0. (13)
Here, bϕc and dϕe denote, respectively, the lower semicontinuous and the upper semicon-
tinuous envelopes of the function ϕ. The partial derivatives ∂Ψi∂uj are evaluated at the point
u =
(
EνZi,EνZ2i , . . . ,EνZ
ki
i
)
.
Under assumption (A1) alone (i.e., (A2) may fail):
3. If there is some (xˆi, zˆi) ∈ R2 satisfying (11), such that
ki∑
j=1
jzˆj−1i
∂Ψi
∂uj
< 0, then
ν {U(Lν) = U(c)} = 1.
4. Inequality (12) holds for every (xˆi, zˆi) ∈ R2 satisfying (13) such that
ki∑
j=1
jzˆj−1i
∂Ψi
∂uj
> 0.
Remark 4.5 From the definition of HX , it follows that if νZi is concentrated in a single
point a, then Pr{Xi < a} = 0.
Remark 4.6 If U is a exponential utility function, then assumption (A2) holds for any
ν ∈ HX such that EνU(Lν) > −∞. Therefore, we may take assumption (A2) as granted
whenever there is some constant R > 0 such that
lim inf
x→−∞
(
eRxU(x)
)
> −∞.
Remark 4.7 Notice that Eν
(X[i],Z[i])|XiU
′(Lν)(xˆi, zˆi) is the (infinitesimal) variation of the
expected utility due to an (infinitesimal) variation in the cover of risk i in the neighbourhood
of xˆi, while
ki∑
j=1
jzˆj−1i
∂Ψi
∂uj
is the corresponding variation in the premium for risk i. Thus,
conditions (10), (12) express a very natural economic trade-off between the (local) effect of
changing the cover for the event of a particular level of risk i and the (global) effect on the
expected utility due to the corresponding change in premium amount.
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Proof of Theorem 4.4. Notice that, for any ν ∈ HX , α ∈ R, ε ≥ 0:
Eν˜U (Lν˜) =Eν˜U (Lν − (Pi(ν˜)− Pi(ν))) =
=
∫
Bi,ε
U (Lν − (Pi(ν˜)− Pi(ν)) + α) dν+
+
∫
R2n\Bi,ε
U (Lν − (Pi(ν˜)− Pi(ν))) dν. (14)
Let ν ∈ HX be an optimal randomized strategy and suppose that assumption (A1) holds.
Suppose there is some (xˆi, zˆi) satisfying (11) such that
ki∑
j=1
jzˆj−1i
∂Ψi
∂uj
< 0. By Lemma 4.3,
Pi(ν˜)− Pi(ν) < 0 holds for sufficiently small ε > 0, α > 0. Therefore,
(Lν − (Pi(ν˜)− Pi(ν)) + α)χBi,ε + (Lν − (Pi(ν˜)− Pi(ν)))χBci,ε > Lν .
Thus, statement 3 must hold, due to optimality of ν and monotonicity of U .
Now, suppose that assumption (A2) also holds, and fix δ > 0 such that EνU (Lν − δ) >
−∞. Due to Lemma 4.3, Pi(ν˜)− Pi(ν) < δ whenever ε and α are sufficiently small. Further,
optimality of ν and equality (14) imply
Eν˜U(Lν˜) ≤ EνU(Lν)⇔
⇔
∫
Bi,ε
U (Lν − (Pi(ν˜)− Pi(ν)) + α)− U (Lν − (Pi(ν˜)− Pi(ν))) dν ≤
≤ Eν (U (Lν)− U (Lν − (Pi(ν˜)− Pi(ν))))⇔
⇔α
∫
Bi,ε
∫ 1
0
U ′ (Lν − (Pi(ν˜)− Pi(ν)) + tα) dt dν ≤
≤ (Pi(ν˜)− Pi(ν))Eν
∫ 1
0
U ′ (Lν − t (Pi(ν˜)− Pi(ν))) dt. (15)
If (xˆi, zˆi) satisfy (11) and α > 0, then dividing both sides of (15) by αν(Bi,ε), using Fubini’s
theorem and conditional independence of
(
X[i], Z[i]
)
and Zi given Xi, we obtain
1
ν(Bi,ε)
∫ 1
0
∫
Bi,ε
Eν(X[i],Z[i])|XiU
′ (Lν) (xi, zi − (Pi(ν˜)− Pi(ν)) + α) dν ≤
≤Pi(ν˜)− Pi(ν)
αν(Bi,ε)
Eν
∫ 1
0
U ′ (Lν − t (Pi(ν˜)− Pi(ν))) dt. (16)
This implies
inf
|xi−xˆi|+|zi−zˆi|≤ε+α+Pi(ν˜)−Pi(ν)
Eν(X[i],Z[i])|XiU
′ (Lν) (xi, zi) ≤
≤Pi(ν˜)− Pi(ν)
αν(Bi,ε)
Eν
∫ 1
0
U ′ (Lν − t (Pi(ν˜)− Pi(ν))) dt.
Therefore, taking successive limits when ε→ 0+ and α→ 0+ and taking into account Lemma
4.3, one obtains (10).
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Under assumption (A2), inequality (12) can be proved by a similar argument. Just notice
that for α < 0 inequality in (16) holds with the opposite inequality sign, and use supremum
instead of infimum in the last step.
To prove statement 4, notice that if (xˆi, zˆi) satisfies (13) and
ki∑
j=1
jzˆj−1i
∂Ψi
∂uj
> 0, then Pi(ν˜)−
Pi(ν) < 0 for ε > 0 and α < 0 close to zero. Hence, integrability of U (Lν − (Pi(ν˜)− Pi(ν)))
follows from monotonicity of U , and therefore inequality (12) does not depend on assumption
(A2).
In Section 5, we will present conditions guaranteeing that optimal treaties are determin-
istic. In view of those results, we present the following version of Theorem 4.4.
Theorem 4.8 Suppose that U is continuously differentiable in ]−∞, c[, and let ν ∈ HX be an
optimal randomized strategy. Fix i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} such that the function Ψi is continuous in
Dki ∪
{
u ∈ [0,+∞[ki : u1 = u
1
2
2 = . . . = u
1
ki
ki
}
, continuously differentiable in Dki, and suppose
that assumptions (A1), (A2) of Theorem 4.4 hold.
If the marginal distributon µXi is absolutely continuous except possibly for an atom at
xi = 0 and the strategy prescribed by ν for the risk i is deterministic (i.e., Zi = Zi(Xi)), then
the optimal treaty Zi satisfies the conditions
Eν(X[i],Z[i])|XiU
′ (Lν) (xi, Zi(xi)) ≤
ki∑
j=1
∂Ψi
∂uj
jZi(xi)
j−1EνU ′ (Lν)
for µXi-a.e. xi > 0 such that Zi(xi) < xi;
Eν(X[i],Z[i])|XiU
′ (Lν) (xi, Zi(xi)) ≥
ki∑
j=1
∂Ψi
∂uj
jZi(xi)
j−1EνU ′ (Lν)
for µXi-a.e. xi > 0 such that Zi(xi) > 0.
The partial derivatives ∂Ψi∂uj are evaluated at the point
u =
(
EZi(Xi),EZi(Xi)2, . . . ,EZi(Xi)ki
)
.
Proof. The proof follows an argument similar to the proof of Theorem 4.4, with some
adaptations.
The absolute continuity assumption on the marginal distribution µXi means that there is
a constant α ∈ [0, 1[ and a non-negative function fXi such that
µXi(A) = αδ0(A) +
∫
A
fXi(xi)dxi ∀A ∈ B[0,+∞[,
where δ0 denotes the Dirac measure concentrated at xi = 0.
Let Zi be the optimal treaty for risk i, and ν ∈ HX be the optimal strategy for the total
portfolio of risks. Thus,
ν(A) =
∫
R
∫
R2n−2
χA
(
x, z[i], Zi(xi)
)
ν(X[i],Z[i])|Xi
(
xi, d(x[i], z[i])
)
µXi(dxi)
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for any A ∈ BR2n . For fixed xˆi ∈]0,+∞[, ε > 0, ζ ∈ Q ∩ [0, xˆi[, let
Z˜i(xi) =
{
Zi(xi), for xi /∈]xˆi − ε, xˆi + ε[,
ζ, for xi ∈]xˆi − ε, xˆi + ε[,
and let ν˜ be the corresponding measure in BR2n . Notice that ν˜ ∈ HX , provided ε is sufficiently
small.
An argument similar to the proof of Lemma 4.3 shows that
Pi(ν˜)− Pi(ν) =2ε (ζ − Zi(xˆi))
ki∑
j=1
∂Ψi
∂uj
jZi(xˆi)
j−1fXi(xˆi)+
+ εo (ζ − Zi(xˆi)) + o(ε),
for every xˆi, a Lebesgue point of the functions Z
j
i fXi , j = 0, 1, . . . , ki. Thus,
Eν˜U (Lν˜) =
=
∫
R\]xˆi−ε,xˆi+ε[
∫
R2n−2
U (Lν − (Pi(ν˜)− Pi(ν))) dν(X[i],Z[i])|XidµXi+
+
∫ xˆi+ε
xˆi−ε
∫
R2n−2
U (Lν − (Pi(ν˜)− Pi(ν)) + ζ − Zi) dν(X[i],Z[i])|XidµXi =
=EνU (Lν − (Pi(ν˜)− Pi(ν))) +
+
∫ xˆi+ε
xˆi−ε
∫
R2n−2
(U (Lν − (Pi(ν˜)− Pi(ν)) + ζ − Zi)− U (Lν − (Pi(ν˜)− Pi(ν))))
dν(X[i],Z[i])|XidµXi .
Optimality of ν implies that Eν˜U (Lν˜) ≤ EνU (Lν), that is∫ xˆi+ε
xˆi−ε
∫
R2n−2
(U (Lν − (Pi(ν˜)− Pi(ν)) + ζ − Zi)− U (Lν − (Pi(ν˜)− Pi(ν))))
dν(X[i],Z[i])|XidµXi ≤
≤Eν (U (Lν − (Pi(ν˜)− Pi(ν)))− U (Lν)) .
Since U is concave and Pi(ν˜) → Pi(ν) when ε → 0, it follows that for any constant η ∈
Q∩]0,+∞[, the inequality∫ xˆi+ε
xˆi−ε
Eν(X[i],Z[i])|Xi
∫ 1
0
U ′ (Lν + η + t(ζ − Zi)) dt (ζ − Zi) dµXi ≤
≤ (Pi(ν˜)− Pi(ν))Eν
∫ 1
0
U ′ (Lν − t (Pi(ν˜)− Pi(ν))) dt
holds for every sufficiently small ε > 0. Dividing both sides by ε, making ε → 0, and using
Lebesgue’s dominated convergence theorem, we obtain
Eν(X[i],Z[i])|Xi
∫ 1
0
U ′ (Lν + η + t(ζ − Zi(xˆi))) dt (ζ − Zi(xˆi)) ≤
15
≤(ζ − Zi(xˆi))
ki∑
j=1
∂Ψi
∂uj
jZi(xˆi)
j−1EνU ′ (Lν) + o (ζ − Zi(xˆi)) ,
for every xˆi > 0, a Lebesgue point of the functions Z
j
i fXi , j = 0, 1, . . . , ki and Eν(X[i],Z[i])|Xi
∫ 1
0 U
′ (Lν + η + t(ζ − Zi)) dt (ζ − Zi) fXi ,
such that fXi(xˆi) > 0.
If Zi(xˆi) < xˆi (resp., Zi(xˆi) > 0), then we can pick a sequence ζk ↘ Zi(xˆi) (resp.,
ζk ↗ Zi(xˆi)) and obtain
Eν(X[i],Z[i])|XiU
′ (Lν + η) ≤
ki∑
j=1
∂Ψi
∂uj
jZi(xˆi)
j−1EνU ′ (Lν)
(resp., Eν
(X[i],Z[i])|XiU
′ (Lν + η) ≤
ki∑
j=1
∂Ψi
∂uj
jZi(xˆi)
j−1EνU ′ (Lν)). Since η is arbitrary, the result
follows by Lebesgue’s dominated convergence theorem.
5 Deterministic optimal treaties
In this Section we show that under mild conditions the optimal treaty is of the deterministic
type.
5.1 Problems with deterministic optimal strategies
The main result in this section is the following theorem.
Theorem 5.1 Suppose that U is differentiable in ]−∞, c[, let ν ∈ HX be an optimal random-
ized strategy, and suppose that assumption (A2) of Theorem 4.4 holds. Pick i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}
such that the marginal distribution µXi has no atoms except possibly at xi = 0, and the
function Ψi is continuous in Dki ∪
{
u ∈ [0,+∞[ki : u1 = u
1
2
2 = . . . = u
1
ki
ki
}
, continuously dif-
ferentiable in Dki. Let ϕi,ν : [0,+∞[ 7→ R be the function
ϕi,ν(t) = EνU ′ (Lν)
ki∑
j=1
∂Ψi
∂uj
(
EνZi,EνZ2i , . . . ,EνZ
ki
i
)
tj .
If the functions U , −ϕi,ν are concave, with at least one of them being strictly concave,
then the strategy prescribed by ν for the risk i is deterministic.
Proof. Pick ν ∈ HX , and suppose that the strategy it prescribes for risk i is not deterministic.
Then, the marginal distribution νZi is not concentrated at a single point and there are xˆi, zˆi, z˜i,
with 0 ≤ zˆi < z˜i ≤ xˆi, such that
ν (Bi,ε(xˆi, zˆi)) > 0, ν (Bi,ε(xˆi, z˜i)) > 0, ∀ε > 0.
Fix xˆi, zˆi, z˜i as above and pick constants α, β > 0 such that α+ β < z˜i − zˆi, and therefore
0 ≤ zˆi < zˆi + α < z˜i − β < z˜i ≤ xˆi.
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Let Aˆ, A˜ be open cylinders
Aˆ =
{
(x, z) ∈ R2n : (xi, zi) ∈ Aˆi
}
, A˜ =
{
(x, z) ∈ R2n : (xi, zi) ∈ A˜i
}
,
with
Aˆi ⊂
{
(xi, zi) ∈ R2 : (xi − xˆi)2 + (zi − zˆi)2 < ε2
}
A˜i ⊂
{
(xi, zi) ∈ R2 : (xi − xˆi)2 + (zi − z˜i)2 < ε2
}
,
and let ν˜ be the measure
ν˜(B) =ν
(
B \ (Aˆ ∪ A˜)
)
+ ν
{
(x, z) ∈ Aˆ : (x, z + αei) ∈ B
}
+
+ ν
{
(x, z) ∈ A˜ : (x, z − βei) ∈ B
}
.
For ε sufficiently small, ν˜ is an element of HX . The argument used to prove Lemma 4.1 shows
that (
Eν˜ − Eν)Zki =
=ν(Aˆ)
(
(zˆi + α)
k − zˆki +O(ε)
)
+ ν(A˜)
(
(z˜i − β)k − z˜ki +O(ε)
)
,
for any k ∈ N such that EZki < +∞. Therefore, the argument used to prove Lemma 4.3
shows that
Pi(ν˜)− Pi(ν) =ν(Aˆ)
ki∑
j=1
∂Ψi
∂uj
×
(
(zˆi + α)
j − zˆji +O(ε)
)
+
+ ν(A˜)
ki∑
j=1
∂Ψi
∂uj
×
(
(z˜i − β)j − z˜ji +O(ε)
)
+
+ o
(
ν(Aˆ) + ν(A˜)
)
, (17)
where the partial derivatives ∂Ψi∂uj are evaluated at the point u =
(
EνZi,EνZ2i , . . . ,EνZ
ki
i
)
. It
follows that
Eν˜U (Lν˜)− EνU (Lν) =
=
∫
Aˆ
U (Lν − (Pi(ν˜)− Pi(ν)) + α) dν +
∫
A˜
U (Lν − (Pi(ν˜)− Pi(ν))− β) dν+
+
∫
R2n\(Aˆ∪A˜)
U (Lν − (Pi(ν˜)− Pi(ν))) dν −
∫
R2n
U (Lν) dν.
Under assumption (A2) and differentiability of U , this is
Eν˜U (Lν˜)− EνU (Lν) =
=α
∫
Aˆ
∫ 1
0
U ′ (Lν − (Pi(ν˜)− Pi(ν)) + tα) dt dν−
− β
∫
A˜
∫ 1
0
U ′ (Lν − (Pi(ν˜)− Pi(ν))− tβ) dt dν−
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− (Pi(ν˜)− Pi(ν))
∫
R2n
∫ 1
0
U ′ (Lν − t(Pi(ν˜)− Pi(ν))) dt dν.
Taking into account concavity of U and estimate (17), this implies
Eν˜U (Lν˜)− EνU (Lν) ≥
≥α
∫
Aˆ
U ′
(
Lν + α+O(ν(Aˆ) + ν(A˜))
)
dν−
− β
∫
A˜
U ′
(
Lν − β +O(ν(Aˆ) + ν(A˜))
)
dν−
− (Pi(ν˜)− Pi(ν))
∫
R2n
U ′
(
Lν +O(ν(Aˆ) + ν(A˜))
)
dν ≥
≥α
∫
Aˆ
Eν(X[i],Z[i])|XiU
′ (Lν) (xˆi, zˆi + α+O(ε)) dν−
− β
∫
A˜
Eν(X[i],Z[i])|XiU
′ (Lν) (xˆi, z˜i − β +O(ε)) dν−
− (Pi(ν˜)− Pi(ν))
∫
R2n
U ′
(
Lν +O(ν(Aˆ) + ν(A˜))
)
dν =
=αν(Aˆ)Eν(X[i],Z[i])|XiU
′ (Lν) (xˆi, zˆi + α+O(ε))−
− βν(A˜)Eν(X[i],Z[i])|XiU
′ (Lν) (xˆi, z˜i − β +O(ε))−
− ν(Aˆ)
ki∑
j=1
∂Ψi
∂uj
(
(zˆi + α)
j − zˆji +O(ε)
)
EνU ′ (Lν)−
− ν(A˜)
ki∑
j=1
∂Ψi
∂uj
(
(z˜i − β)j − z˜ji +O(ε)
)
EνU ′ (Lν) + o
(
ν(Aˆ) + ν(A˜)
)
.
Since the distribution of Xi has no atoms except possibly 0 and xˆi > 0, for every ε > 0 there
is a pair of cylinders Aˆε, A˜ε such that:
1. Aˆε = Bi,ε(xˆi, zˆi), or A˜ε = Bi,ε(xˆi, z˜i);
2. αν
(
Aˆε
)
= βν
(
A˜ε
)
.
For such pairs of cylinders, the estimate above becomes
Eν˜U (Lν˜)− EνU (Lν) ≥
≥αν
(
Aˆε
)(
Eν(X[i],Z[i])|XiU
′ (Lν) (xˆi, zˆi + α+O(ε))−
− Eν(X[i],Z[i])|XiU
′ (Lν) (xˆi, z˜i − β +O(ε)) +
+ EνU ′ (Lν)
ki∑
j=1
∂Ψi
∂uj
(
(z˜i − β)j − z˜ji
−β +O(ε)
)
−
− EνU ′ (Lν)
ki∑
j=1
∂Ψi
∂uj
(
(zˆi + α)
j − zˆji
α
+O(ε)
))
+ o
(
ν
(
Aˆε
))
=
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=αν
(
Aˆε
)(
Eν(X[i],Z[i])|XiU
′ (Lν) (xˆi, zˆi + α+O(ε))−
− Eν(X[i],Z[i])|XiU
′ (Lν) (xˆi, z˜i − β +O(ε)) +
+
ϕi,ν(z˜i − β)− ϕi,ν(z˜i)
−β −
ϕi,ν(zˆi + α)− ϕi,ν(zˆi)
α
+O(ε)
)
+
+ o
(
ν
(
Aˆε
))
.
Since U is concave,
Eν(X[i],Z[i])|XiU
′ (Lν) (xˆi, zˆi + α+O(ε)) ≥
≥Eν(X[i],Z[i])|XiU
′ (Lν) (xˆi, z˜i − β +O(ε))
holds for sufficiently small ε, with strict inequality if U is strictly concave. In addition, since
ϕi,ν is convex,
ϕi,ν(z˜i − β)− ϕi,ν(z˜i)
−β ≥
ϕi,ν(zˆi + α)− ϕi,ν(zˆi)
α
holds, and the inequality is strict if ϕi,ν is strictly convex.
It follows that for sufficiently small ε > 0, Eν˜U (Lν˜) > EνU (Lν), and therefore ν is not
optimal.
The following corollary gives conditions that are easier to check than the conditions in
Theorem 5.1.
Corollary 5.2 Suppose that U is differentiable and concave in ]−∞, c[, and let ν ∈ HX be
an optimal randomized strategy. Suppose that assumption (A2) of Theorem 4.4 holds, and
the marginal distribution µXi has no atoms except, possibly, at xi = 0.
Suppose that the reinsurance premium for risk i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} is computed by a function
Ψi of the moments of order up to ki ∈ N, continuous in Dki∪
{
u ∈ [0,+∞[ki : u1 = u
1
2
2 = . . . = u
1
ki
ki
}
,
continuously differentiable in Dki, such that
∂Ψi
∂uj
(u) ≥ 0 ∀j ≥ 2, u ∈ Dki .
If at least one of the following conditions holds:
1. The functions ∂Ψi∂uj , j = 1, 2, . . . , ki, have at most one common zero in Dki, and E
νU ′(Lν) >
0;
2. U is strictly concave in ]−∞, c];
then the optimal reinsurance for risk i is deterministic.
Proof. Under the assumptions of the corollary, the functions U , −ϕi,ν are concave with at
least one of them being strictly concave. Thus, the result follows immediately from Theorem
5.1.
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5.2 The expected value principle
From Theorem 4.8 and Corollary 5.2, it is easy to check that under mild conditions, the
optimal stategy concerning a risk for which the reinsurance premium is computed by the
expected value principle is deterministic, and derive the corresponding optimality condition.
More precisely, we obtain the following corollary:
Corollary 5.3 Suppose that U is continuously differentiable and concave in ] − ∞, c[, let
ν ∈ HX be an optimal randomized strategy, and suppose that assumption (A2) of Theorem
4.4 holds.
If the reinsurance premium for risk i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} is computed by the expected value
principle (i.e., Ψi(u) = (1 + θi)u), and the marginal distribution µXi is absolutely contin-
uous except, possibly, for an atom at xi = 0, then the optimal reinsurance for risk i is a
deterministic function Zi ∈ Zi, such that
Eν(X[i],Z[i])|XiU
′ (Lν) (xi, 0) ≤ (1 + θi)EνU ′(Lν) if Zi(xi) = 0,
Eν(X[i],Z[i])|XiU
′ (Lν) (xi, Zi(xi)) = (1 + θi)EνU ′(Lν) if 0 < Zi(xi) < xi,
Eν(X[i],Z[i])|XiU
′ (Lν) (xi, xi) ≥ (1 + θi)EνU ′(Lν) if Zi(xi) = xi,
holds for µXi-almost every xi.
Proof. The fact that the optimal reinsurance strategy for risk i is deterministic follows
immediately from Corollary 5.2. Thus, the optimality conditions follow from Theorem 4.8.
5.3 The stop-loss is not optimal
It is known [Cai and Wei, 2012] that if all reinsurance premia are calculated by expected value
principia, and the risks are positively dependent in stochastic order, then stop-loss treaties
Zi(x) = max(0, x −Mi) are optimal among the class of all deterministic treaties such that
the retained risks Xi − Zi(Xi) are increasing functions of Xi.
We will now show that stop-loss treaties are in general not optimal in the wider class of
measurable deterministic treaties, even in the setting above. Thus, the monotonicity con-
straint on the retained risk is typically an active constraint.
Consider two risks, X1 and X2, with absolutely continuous (marginal) distributions with
support [0,+∞[, each being reinsured through a stop-loss treaty, priced by an expected value
premium principle:
Zi(x) = max (0, x−Mi) , P (Zi) = (1 + θi)EZi(Xi), i = 1, 2,
and consider an exponential utility function
U(x) = −e−Rx.
By Corollary 5.3, if such a strategy is optimal, then the conditions
(1 + θi)E
[
eR(X1−Z1+X2−Z2)
]
> E
[
eR(X1−Z1+X2−Z2)|Xi = xi
]
xi 6Mi
(1 + θi)E
[
eR(X1−Z1+X2−Z2)
]
= E
[
eR(X1−Z1+X2−Z2)|Xi = xi
]
xi >Mi
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hold for µXi-almost every xi, i = 1, 2. Thus, for i = 1 (and similarly for i = 2), we have
(1 + β1)E
[
eR(X1−Z1+X2−Z2)
]
= eRM1E
[
eR(X2−Z2)|X1 = x1
]
, (18)
for µX1-almost every x1 ≥M1. If X1 and X2 are dependent through a given copula C(u, v),
then
E
[
eR(X2−Z2)|X1 = x1
]
=
= eRM2 −
∫ M2
0
(
eRM2 − eRx2) ∂2C
∂u∂v
(u, F2(x2))f2(x2) dx2,
which, from (18), must be constant for u ∈ [F (M1), 1], implying that:∫ M2
0
(
eRM2 − eRx2) ∂3C
∂u2∂v
(u, F2(x2))f2(x2) dx2 = 0, ∀u ∈ [F1(M1), 1]. (19)
Consider now that the risks are dependent through a copula:
C(u, v) = uv (1 + (u− 1)(v − 1)α) , with α ∈]0, 1]. (20)
Since
∂2C
∂u2
= 2v(v − 1)α ≤ 0, ∂
2C
∂v2
= 2u(u− 1)α ≤ 0, ∀(u, v) ∈ [0, 1]2,
the risks X1, X2 are positively dependent in stochastic ordering. Further,
∂3C
∂u2∂v
= 2(2v− 1)α
and, the derivative with respect to M2 of the left-hand side of (19) becomes
∂
∂M2
∫ M2
0
(
eRM2 − eRx2) ∂3C
∂u2∂v
(u, F2(x2))f2(x2) dx2 =
= ReRM22αF2(M2) [F2(M2)− 1] < 0.
Hence, M2 = 0 is the unique value of M2 satisfying (19), i.e., stop-loss is optimal only if it is
optimal to cede the totality of the risk.
5.4 Variance-related principles
If the reinsurance premium is computed by a variance-related premium calculation principle,
then the optimal treaty for that risk is deterministic and the optimality conditions are as
follows.
Corollary 5.4 Suppose that U is differentiable and concave in ]−∞, c[, and let ν ∈ HX be
an optimal randomized strategy, and suppose that assumption (A2) of Theorem 4.4 holds
If the marginal distribution µXi is absolutely continuous except possibly for an atom at
xi = 0, and the reinsurance premium for risk i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} is computed by a variance-
related principle
Pi(ν) = EνZi + g
(
EνZ2i − (EνZi)2
)
,
with g continuous in [0,+∞[, continuously differentiable in ]0,+∞[, monotonically increasing,
then the optimal reinsurance for risk i is a deterministic function Zi ∈ Zi such that
Eν(X[i],Z[i])|XiU
′(Lν)(xi, 0) ≤
(
1− 2EZig′(Var(Zi))
)
EνU ′(Lν) if Zi(xi) = 0,
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Eν(X[i],Z[i])|XiU
′(Lν)(xi, Zi(xi)) =
(
1 + 2 (Zi(xi)− EZi) g′(Var(Zi))
)
EνU ′(Lν) if 0 < Zi(xi) < xi,
Eν(X[i],Z[i])|XiU
′(Lν)(xi, xi) ≥
(
1 + 2 (xi − EZi) g′(Var(Zi))
)
EνU ′(Lν) if Zi(xi) = xi
holds for µXi-almost every xi.
Proof. Under the assumptions of the Corollary,
Ψi(u1, u2) = u1 + g(u2 − u21)
Is continuous in D2 ∪
{
(u1, u2) ∈ [0,+∞[2: u1 = u
1
2
2
}
, continuously differentiable in D2, and
∂Ψi
∂u1
(u1, u2) = 1− 2u1g′
(
u2 − u21
)
,
∂Ψi
∂u2
(u1, u2) = g
′ (u2 − u21) .
By assumption, ∂Ψi∂u2 ≥ 0, and clearly
∂Ψi
∂u1
, ∂Ψi∂u2 have no common zeros. Thus, Corollary 5.2
guarantees that the optimal strategy for risk i is deterministic, and the optimality conditions
follow from Theorem 4.8.
Notice that the assumptions of Corollary 5.4 (and a fortiori, Theorem 5.1) include cases
where the premium calculation principle is not a convex functional in the space of determin-
istic strategies. For details, see the characterization of convex variance related principia in
[Guerra and Centeno, 2010], Proposition 1.
6 Numerical illustration
We present here some numerical examples illustrating the theoretical results of this work.
We will not go into detail on the numerical strategy for solving the optimization problem,
which will be the subject of future work. It consists on the implementation of a direct
minimization algorithm. The solution Zi(Xi) of the ceded risk is found at discretization
points as the solution of the discretized minimization problem. The discretization points are
chosen to be quantiles of each marginal distributions and linear interpolation is performed.
We consider two risks, X1 and X2, with distribution functions given by F1(x) = 1 − e−x
and F2(x) = 1 −
(
4
4+x
)5
, respectively, such that E[X1] = E[X2] = 1 and V ar[X1] = 1
and V ar[X2] = 5/3. Three different dependence structures will be analysed, by means of
copulas. We will consider three different premium calculation principles: (i) the expected
value principle, in which case the loadings are chosen to be θ1 = 0.3 and θ2 = 0.5 for risks X1
and X2, respectively; (ii) the standard deviation principle, for which the premium loadings
are θ1 = θ2 = 0.5. (ii) and the variance principle, for which the premium loadings are
θ1 = θ2 = 0.5. The results are presented in comparison with the independence case.
Regarding the dependence structure, we will consider Frank’s Copula, given by ([Denuit et al., 2005]):
Cα(u1, u2) = − 1
α
log
(
1 +
(e−αu1 − 1)(e−αu2 − 1)
e−α − 1
)
.
This copula is known to have no upper nor lower tail dependence. When the copula parameter
α = 0, the random variables are independent, if α > 0 there is a positive dependence and
when α < 0 the dependence is negative. We consider two cases: α = 10, and α = −10.
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We also consider a copula, with no general expression, which includes positive and negative
dependencies in different regions of the domain. The three copulas are represented in Figure
1. The numerical solutions of the optimal treaties are presented in Figures 2, 3, and 4.
In the case of positive dependence (Figure 2) we observe that for the expected value
principle, the optimal treaty for risk X1 (light tailed) is a decreasing function of the retained
risk (notice that the plot represents the ceded risk). In this case, the optimal treaty under
independence is the stop loss. Regarding the variance related principles, the optimal treaty
under dependence has similar behaviour to that of the independent case, but the ceded risk
is higher when positive dependencies are present.
When the risks are negatively dependent (Figure 3), the optimal ceded risk is always
lower than the optimal ceded risk under independence, whatever the premium principle and
for both risks. When the variance or the standard deviation principles are considered, the
optimal ceded risk is a non-monotonic function. It is zero on neighbourhood of the expected
value, being the minimum between a convex function and the claim amount.
In the case of more complex dependencies (Figure 4), including negative and positive
dependencies along the domain, the optimal treaty exhibits abrupt swings in the amount of
ceded risk. For the light-tailed risk (X1), the optimal treaty cedes all the risk at small claim
amounts and cedes no risk on the tail. For the heavy-tailed risk (X2) it is optimal to cede
all the risk at small claim amounts and at the tail, ceding no risk in a neighbourhood of the
expected value. This pattern persists for all three premium principles being considered. This
example shows that dependencies may lead to unexpected optimal treaties, specially when
more intricate dependencies are at stake.
Figure 1: The three copulas considered. Left: Frank’s copula with α = 10; Middle: Frank’s
copula with α = −10; Right: copula including positive and negative dependencies.
Acknowledgments
The authors were partially supported by the Project CEMAPRE/REM - UIDB/05069/2020 - financed
by FCT/MCTES through national funds.
References
[Albrecher et al., 2017] Albrecher, H., Beirlant, J., and Teugels, J. L., editors (2017). Reinsurance:
Actuarial and Statistical Aspects. Wiley.
[Albrecher and Cani, 2019] Albrecher, H. and Cani, A. (2019). On randomized reinsurance contracts.
Insurance: Mathematics and Economics, 84:67–78.
23
0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5
1
2
3
Risk 1 - Expected Value
Risk Ceded Risk (ind.) Ceded Risk (dep.) 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
Risk 1 - Standard Deviation
Risk Ceded Risk (ind.) Ceded Risk (dep.) 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
Risk 1 - Variance
Risk Ceded Risk (ind.) Ceded Risk (dep.)
1 2 3 4
1
2
3
4
Risk 2 - Expected Value
Risk Ceded Risk (ind.) Ceded Risk (dep.) 1 2 3 4
1
2
3
4
Risk 2 - Standard Deviation
Risk Ceded Risk (ind.) Ceded Risk (dep.) 1 2 3 4
1
2
3
4
Risk 2 - Variance
Risk Ceded Risk (ind.) Ceded Risk (dep.)
Figure 2: Optimal reinsurance treaties for risks X1 and X2 for the three premium calculation
principles when the risks are dependent through Frank’s copula with α = 10. In blue is
represented the underlying risk, in yellow the optimal solution (ceded risk) for the independent
case and in green the optimal solution (ceded risk) in the dependent case.
[Asimit et al., 2017] Asimit, A., Bignozzi, V., Cheung, K., Hu, J., and Kim, E. (2017). Robust and
Pareto optimality of insurance contracts. European Journal of Operational Research, 262(2):720–
732.
[Asimit et al., 2018] Asimit, A., Gao, T., Hu, J., and Kim, E. (2018). Optimal risk transfer: A
numerical optimisation approach. North American Actuarial Journal, 22(3):341–364.
[Bai et al., 2013] Bai, L., Cai, J., and Zhou, M. (2013). Optimal reinsurance policies for an insurer
with a bivariate reserve risk process in a dynamic setting. Insurance: Mathematics and Economics,
53(3):664–670.
[Bi et al., 2016] Bi, J., Liand, Z., and Xu, F. (2016). Optimal mean variance investment and rein-
surance problems for the risk model with common shock dependence. Insurance: Mathematics and
Economics, 70:245–258.
[Billingsley, 1999] Billingsley, P. (1999). Convergence of probability measures. Wiley. 2nd edition.
[Borch, 1960] Borch, K. (1960). An attempt to determine the optimum amount of stop loss reinsur-
ance. In Transactions of the 16th International Congress of Actuaries I, pages 597 – 610.
[Cai and Wei, 2012] Cai, J. and Wei, W. (2012). Optimal reinsurance with positively dependent risks.
Insurance: Mathematics and Economics, 50:57–63.
[Cani and Thonhauser, 2016] Cani, A. and Thonhauser, S. (2016). An optimal reinsurance problem
in the Cramr-Lundberg model. Mathematical Methods of Operations Research, 85(2):179–205.
[C¸inlar, 2011] C¸inlar, E. (2011). Probability and stochastics. Springer.
[Centeno, 2005] Centeno, M.L. (2005). Dependent risks and excess of loss reinsurance. Insurance:
Mathematics and Economics, 37:229–238.
24
0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5
1
2
3
Risk 1 - Expected Value
Risk Ceded Risk (ind.) Ceded Risk (dep.) 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5
1
2
3
Risk 1 - Standard Deviation
Risk Ceded Risk (ind.) Ceded Risk (dep.) 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5
1
2
3
Risk 1 - Variance
Risk Ceded Risk (ind.) Ceded Risk (dep.)
1 2 3 4
1
2
3
4
Risk 2 - Expected Value
Risk Ceded Risk (ind.) Ceded Risk (dep.) 1 2 3 4
1
2
3
4
Risk 2 - Standard Deviation
Risk Ceded Risk (ind.) Ceded Risk (dep.) 1 2 3 4
1
2
3
4
Risk 2 - Variance
Risk Ceded Risk (ind.) Ceded Risk (dep.)
Figure 3: Optimal reinsurance treaties for risks X1 and X2 for the three premium calculation
principles when the risks are dependent through Frank’s copula with α = −10. In blue is
represented the underlying risk, in yellow the optimal solution (ceded risk) for the independent
case and in green the optimal solution (ceded risk) in the dependent case.
[Cheung et al., 2014a] Cheung, K., Sung, K., Yam, S., and Yung, S. (2014a). Optimal reinsurance
under general law-invariant risk measures. Scandinavian Actuarial Journal, 1:72–91.
[Cheung et al., 2014b] Cheung, K. C., Sung, K. C. J., and Yam, S. C. P. (2014b). Riskminimizing
reinsurance protection for multivariate risks. The Journal of Risk and Insurance, 81(1):219–236.
[Chi et al., 2017] Chi, Y., Lin, X. S., and Tan, K. S. (2017). Optimal reinsurance under the risk-
adjusted value of an insurer’s liability and an economic reinsurance premium principle. North
American Actuarial Journal, 21:417–432.
[Denuit et al., 2005] Denuit, M., Dhaene, J., Goovaerts, M., and Kaas, R. (2005). Actuarial Theory
for Dependent Risks. John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
[Gajek and Zagrodny, 2004] Gajek, L. and Zagrodny, D. (2004). Reinsurance arrangements maximiz-
ing insurer′s survival probability. The Journal of Risk and Insurance, 71(3):421 – 435.
[Gu et al., 2018] Gu, A., F.G.Viens, and Yao, H. (2018). Optimal robust reinsurance-investment
strategies for insurers with mean reversion and mispricing. Insurance: Mathematics and Economics,
80:93–109.
[Guerra and Centeno, 2012] Guerra, M. and Centeno, M. (2012). Are quantile risk measures suitable
for risk-transfer decisions? Insurance: Mathematics and Economics, 50(3):446 – 461.
[Guerra and Centeno, 2008] Guerra, M. and Centeno, M.L. (2008). Optimal reinsurance policy: the
adjustment coefficient and the expected utility criteria. Insurance: Mathematics and Economics,
42:529–539.
[Guerra and Centeno, 2010] Guerra, M. and Centeno, M.L. (2010). Optimal reinsurance for variance
related premium calculation principles. Astin Bulletin, 40(1):97–121.
25
0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5
1
2
3
Risk 1 - Expected Value
Risk Ceded Risk (ind.) Ceded Risk (dep.) 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
Risk 1 - Standard Deviation
Risk Ceded Risk (ind.) Ceded Risk (dep.) 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5
1
2
3
Risk 1 - Variance
Risk Ceded Risk (ind.) Ceded Risk (dep.)
1 2 3 4
1
2
3
4
Risk 2 - Expected Value
Risk Ceded Risk (ind.) Ceded Risk (dep.) 1 2 3 4
1
2
3
4
Risk 2 - Standard Deviation
Risk Ceded Risk (ind.) Ceded Risk (dep.) 1 2 3 4
1
2
3
4
Risk 2 - Variance
Risk Ceded Risk (ind.) Ceded Risk (dep.)
Figure 4: Optimal reinsurance treaties for risks X1 and X2 for the three premium calculation
principles when the risks are dependent through a copula including positive and negative
dependencies (see Figure 1). In blue is represented the underlying risk, in yellow the optimal
solution (ceded risk) for the independent case and in green the optimal solution (ceded risk)
in the dependent case.
[Hu and Wang, 2019] Hu, D. and Wang, H. (2019). Reinsurance contract design when the insurer is
ambiguity-averse. Insurance: Mathematics and Economics, 86:241–255.
[Sun et al., 2017] Sun, H., Weng, C., and Zhang, Y. (2017). Optimal multivariate quota-share reinsur-
ance: A nonparametric mean-CVaR framework. Insurance: Mathematics and Economics, 72:107–
214.
[Tan and Weng, 2014] Tan, K. S. and Weng, C. (2014). Empirical approach for optimal reinsurance
design. North American Actuarial Journal, 2:315–342.
[Zhang et al., 2015] Zhang, L., Hu, X., and Duan, B. (2015). Optimal reinsurance under adjustment
coefficient measure in a discrete risk model based on Poisson MA(1) process. Scandinavian Actuarial
Journal, 2015(5):455–467.
[Zhang et al., 2016] Zhang, N., Jin, Z., Li, S., and Chen, P. (2016). Optimal reinsurance under
dynamic VaR constraint. Insurance: Mathematics and Economics, 71:232–243.
26
